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Abstract—Buried unexploded landmines are a serious threat in
many countries all over the World. As many landmines are nowa-
days mostly plastic made, the use of ground penetrating radar
(GPR) systems for their detection is gaining the trend. However,
despite several techniques have been proposed, a safe automatic
solution is far from being at hand. In this paper, we propose a
landmine detection method based on convolutional autoencoder
applied to B-scans acquired with a GPR. The proposed system
leverages an anomaly detection pipeline: the autoencoder learns
a description of B-scans clear of landmines, and detects landmine
traces as anomalies. In doing so, the autoencoder never uses data
containing landmine traces at training time. This allows to avoid
making strong assumptions on the kind of landmines to detect,
thus paving the way to detection of novel landmine models.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The presence of landmines and explosive remnants of war
represents a serious threat for civilians around the World. As
a matter of fact, even if it is hard to precisely estimate the
number of casualties, more than 25.000 people are killed or
mutilated every year due to landmines [1]. For this reason,
the development of techniques for landmine detection and
minefield clearance is of paramount importance.
To implement a complete landmine detection and localiza-
tion system, a series of different steps have to be developed
[2]: (i) detection - to detect whether any kind of target is
buried within an area of interest, or the area is clear; (ii)
recognition - to discriminate whether at least one of the buried
objects is a landmine, or all objects are just clutter (e.g., stones,
wooden sticks, etc.); (iii) localization - to determine the precise
location of targets of interest. In this work, we focus on the first
step, by proposing an automatic system for object detection.
In the literature, many different landmine detection systems
have been proposed. Some of them, exploit electromagnetic
induction based sensors tailored to capture metal target traces.
However, as landmines are nowadays mostly made of plastic,
ground penetrating radar (GPR) is emerging as a more suitable
technology [3].
A broad family of GPR-based methods works acquiring
and analyzing B-scans of the ground, i.e., 2D images in a
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space-time domain obtained by emitting and recording a signal
with a pair of antennas that are moved on a straight line
parallel to the ground. B-scans should be ideally flat in case
no dielectric discontinuities are present underground. If an
object of limited size characterized by a different dielectric
constant with respect to the ground is buried (e.g., a landmine),
a prominent hyperbola appears. To detect hyperbolas, thus
spotting buried objects, different model-based solutions have
been proposed. To name a few, [4] solves a fitting problem,
[5] proposes a modified Hough transform, whereas [6] and [7]
exploit gradient-based features characterizing B-scan texture.
Due to the recent astonishing deep-learning advancements
in many fields [8], recent methods also started leveraging
convolutional neural networks (CNNs) [9], [10].
In this paper, we propose the first landmine detection
method leveraging a convolutional autoencoder (i.e., a specific
kind of CNN) to analyze B-scans acquired with a GPR.
Specifically, we consider the problem of detecting whether
a B-scan contains any trace of buried object or not. To do
so, we cast landmine detection into an anomaly detection
problem, and solve it through a one-class approach. In a
nutshell, an autoencoder learns a characterization of B-scans
not containing any trace of landmines or other objects at
training time. Upon training completion, the autoencoder can
be used to detect whether a new B-scan under analysis contains
any anomaly with respect to the training set (i.e., presence of
hyperbola, thus objects).
The proposed method is completely data driven, but it has
the inherent advantage of not making strong assumptions on
landmines characteristics (e.g., shape, size, etc.). As long as
buried objects introduce some distortion into a B-scan (i.e., hy-
perbola) compared to B-scans used for training (i.e., obtained
from areas without buried landmines), the system is able to
identify them. Preliminary results on real GPR data acquired in
two different test sites show promising performance compared
to a recently proposed method exploiting CNNs [10].
II. BACKGROUND ON AUTOENCODERS
In this section we quickly introduce to the reader the concept
of autoencoder needed to understand the rest of the paper. For
a thorough autoencoder review, the reader can refer to [11].
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Fig. 1: Scheme of an undercomplete autoencoder. The encoder E
turns the input x into its hidden representation h. This is turned into
xˆ by the decoder D.
An autoencoder is a specific kind of neural network that
takes its name from the ability of being logically split into two
separate components: (i) the encoder, which is the operator E
mapping the input x into the so called hidden representation
h = E(x); (ii) the decoder, which is the operator D that
decodes the hidden representation into an estimate of the input
xˆ = D(h). A visual representation of autoencoder is shown
in Fig. 1.
In this paper, we refer to a specific family of autoencoders
known as undercomplete convolutional autoencoders. These
are characterized by a hidden representation h of reduced
dimensionality with respect to the input x. Moreover, both en-
coder and decoder operators are composed by series of linear
filtering operations (i.e., convolutions), optionally followed by
non linear functions (e.g., sigmoid, hyperbolic tangent, etc.).
By using this kind of autoencoder it is possible to esti-
mate an almost-invertible dimensionality reduction function
E directly from a representative set of training data (i.e.,
observations of x). A common way of doing this consists in a
priori defining a network model (i.e., the series of parametric
operations composing E and D), and estimating the network
weights (i.e., the operations’ parameters) that minimize some
distance metric between the autoencoder input x and its output
xˆ = D(E(x)). The used distance metric is typically referred
to as loss function, and its minimization is carried out through
iterative techniques (e.g., gradient descent methods, etc.). In
the light of this, we can interpret the hidden representation
h = E(x) as a compact feature vector capturing salient
information from x.
III. LANDMINE DETECTION
In this section we formulate the landmine detection problem
faced in this paper, and report all the details about the proposed
detection method.
A. Problem
Let us define a B-scan acquired with a GPR system as the
2D image X. If X has been acquired over a buried target, we
associate to it the binary label l = 1 indicating the presence of
an object underground. If X has been acquired over a target-
free area, we label it with l = 0, indicating that no object traces
are present. Solving landmine detection problem consists in
computing lˆ (i.e., an estimate of l) given a B-scan X. Correct
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Fig. 2: Diagram of the proposed anomaly detection scheme. A patch
under analysis x is autoencoded to xˆ and encoded again into hˆ.
Anomaly is detected by thresholding e value.
B. Proposed Detector
The rationale behind the proposed detector is that autoen-
coders can be a powerful instrument for anomaly detection
[12], [13]. Indeed, an autoencoder tailored to encode and
decode a specific kind of data, fails in encoding and decoding
correctly other kinds of data. The error introduced in encoded
or decoded data can be used as anomaly indicator.
It is therefore possible to train an autoencoder to learn a
characteristic hidden representation of B-scans not showing
any object traces (i.e., labeled as l = 0). After training, this
autoencoder will encode and decode B-scans labeled as l = 0
with good quality. Conversely, it will encode and decode B-
scans labeled as l = 1 with poor quality. In the following, we
describe each step of the proposed method.
1) System Training: In order to be independent from the
B-scan size, we propose to work in a patch-wise fashion. To
this purpose, let us consider xi as the i-th patch of fixed
size extracted from a B-scan X. To train the autoencoder,
we define a training set of I patches xi, i ∈ [1, I] extracted
from B-scans associated to label l = 0 (i.e., do not containing
any hyperbola due to buried objects). We then estimate the
autoencoder weights by minimizing the mean squared error
between xi and xˆi averaged over all patches in the training
set.
2) System Deployment: When a B-scan X is to be analyzed,
we split it into a set of I patches xi, i ∈ [1, I] covering
the whole X. We then follow the block diagram reported
in Fig. 2. Each patch xi is encoded into hi = E(xi). The
hidden representation is decoded into xˆi = D(hi), which is
encoded again into hˆi = E(xˆi). We then compare the hidden
representation of the original patch (i.e., hi) with the hidden
representation of the autoencoded patch (i.e., hˆi) by means of
Euclidean distance.
The obtained distance ei = |hi − hˆi| is an indicator
of possible anomalies. Indeed, we expect patches containing
hyperbola traces to be incorrectly autoencoded, thus giving rise
to hˆi strongly different from hi. Conversely, patches similar to
those observed during training should generate hˆi very similar
to hi.
To detect landmines, we collect all ei, i ∈ [1, I] values be-
longing to patches coming from the B-scan X under analysis,
and apply the following criterion
lˆ =
{
1, if maxi(ei) > Γ,
0, otherwise,
(1)
where Γ is a threshold to be selected. In other words, we detect
presence of landmines if at least one patch xi shows strong
evidence of anomaly.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section we report information about the used network
architectures and datasets.
A. Autoencoder Architecture
We tested three different autoencoder architectures to in-
vestigate its impact. All architectures are symmetric, as to
each convolutional layer used at the encoder, corresponds a
deconvolutional layer at the decoder. The input size of each
network is equal to its output size. Hidden representations
are characterized by a reduced dimensionality with respect to
input.
Architecture N1 is composed by:
1) A convolutional layer with 16 filters, stride 1x1, size
6x6.
2) Three convolutional layer with 16 filters, stride 2x2, size
5x5, 4x4, 3x3, respectively.
3) A convolutional layer with 8 filters, stride 1x1, size 1x1.
Its output is the hidden representation.
4) Four deconvolutional layers with 16 filters, stride 2x2,
size 2x2, 3x3, 4x4, 5x5, respectively.
5) A deconvolutional layers with 1 filter, stride 1x1, size
6x6, followed by hyperbolic tangent activation.
This architecture shrinks the input by a factor 32 (e.g., a 32x32
image is turned into a 32 element hidden representation).
Architecture N2 is the same as N1, but the convolutional
layer returning the hidden representation is substituted by three
layers: (i) one convolutional layer with 16 filters, stride 2x2,
size 2x2; (ii) one convolutional layer with 16 filters, stride 2x2,
size 1x1; (iii) one deconvolutional layer with 16 filters, stride
2x2, size 2x2. This architecture shrinks the input by a factor
64 (e.g., a 32x32 image is turned into a 16 element hidden
representation).
Architecture N3 is the same as N1, but the convolutional
layer returning the hidden representation is substituted by a
convolutional layer with 16 filters, stride 2x2, size 2x2. This
architecture shrinks the input by a factor 16 (e.g., a 32x32
image is turned into a 64 element hidden representation).
All networks have been trained using Adam optimizer
with default parameter until loss function stopped decreasing.
Network input was always normalized in range [−1, 1]. All
tests were run on a workstation equipped with a Titan X GPU



















Fig. 3: Example of an original B-scan X showing an hyperbola (a),
its autoencoded version Xˆ in which the hyperbola is not perfectly
reconstructed (b), and spatial reshape of ei related to B-scan patches.
B. Dataset
All used data has been acquired using the same system
of [10]. Specifically, we used a GPR equipment consisting
in an IDS Aladdin (IDS Georadar srl) radar, a shielded
ground coupled dipole antenna (spaced 9 cm), with a central
frequency and a bandwidth of 2 GHz. A soft pad, the PSG
[14], was placed between the radar equipment and the soil to
ensure accurate measurements and fixed antenna orientation
from trace to trace. We acquired data so that each A-scan
corresponds to a time window of 20ns and contains 384
time samples. For B-scans acquisition we considered inline
sampling of 0.4cm and crossline sampling of 0.8 cm.
With this system we acquired data from two different test
sites. The first setup (i.e., S1) corresponds to the one presented
in [10], consisting of 9 different targets representing inert
landmine models and battlefield debris buried in a sand pit
characterized by a very low clay content and a gritty texture,
at a depth of approximately 10 cm. In this setup we acquired
114 B-scans. The second setup (i.e., S2) consists of 8 targets
representing inert landmine models and rocks buried in long
jump landing pit sand. In this setup we acquired 64 B-scans.
For each setup, we manually labeled each B-scan by knowing
where objects were buried.
As explained during numerical analysis, we constructed dif-
ferent training datasets by changing the amount of considered
training B-scans and setups. For testing, we always considered
all B-scans non used for training belonging to setup S1 only.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we explain the used evaluation metrics and
collect results from our numerical analysis.
A. Evaluation Metrics
The proposed method is based on a threshold Γ. We
therefore evaluated our technique by means of receiver op-
erating characteristic (ROC) curves. A ROC curve represents
the probability of correct detection (i.e., correctly finding an
object) and probability of false detection (i.e., detecting objects
in clear areas) by spanning all possible values of the threshold
Γ. This means that each working point of a ROC curve
determines a specific Γ value. As compact measure of ROC
goodness we selected the area under the curve (AUC). This
measure ranges between 0.5 (i.e., random guess) and 1 (i.e.,
perfect result).
(a) Different training set size B
(b) Different training setup S
Fig. 4: ROC curves under different conditions: (a) proposed N1 and
baseline [10] changing the amount B of used training B-scans; (b)
proposed solution trained on setups S1 and S2, then tested on S1.
B. Numerical Analysis
To provide a visual example of the working method, Fig. 3
shows a B-scan region X, its encoded and decoded version
Xˆ, as well as the patch-by-patch error ei obtained using
architecture N1 with patches of size 32x32. It is possible to
notice that the original hyperbola due to a buried object is
just only mildly reconstructed in Xˆ. Conversely, the rest of
the B-scan is almost perfectly autoencoded. Computing ei it
is possible to clearly spot an area with high mean square error,
corresponding to the detected hyperbola.
To investigate the effect of using more training data, we
tested our architecture N1 using patches of size 32x32 using
B = 1 or B = 3 training B-scans. Fig. 4a shows the ROC
curves for our method, and the baseline [10] in the same
exact conditions. It is possible to notice that our method
improves over [10] when only few data is available for
training. Moreover, we apparently do not need to use a high
number of training images, as results using B = 1 and B = 3
are comparable. It is also worth noting that [10] makes some
assumptions on the kind of expected hyperbola, as its training
contain both patches showing and not hyperbola traces.
Another test we performed consisted in fixing architecture
N1 and changing the image patch size considering 16x16,
32x32 and 64x64. Results remain in line with those presented
in Fig. 4a with a maximum AUC deviation of 1%. We therefore
stopped our investigation on patch size, considering 32x32 a
good choice.
Moreover, we tested the different architectures N1, N2 and
N3 on setup S1 using B = 3 training images. Also in this
case we obtained comparable results, with slight AUC decrease
for N2, which reduces data dimensionality too much. For this
reason we decided to only consider N1 for other tests.
Finally, we performed a cross-dataset test. We trained N1
on B = 3 B-scans split into 32x32 patches using either setup
S1 or S2. Fig. 4b shows results in terms of testing on setup
S1 only. It is possible to notice that the proposed method is
robust against cross-training (i.e., training on S2 and testing
on S1). This means that the system is not strictly tailored to
the only kind of soil used during training.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we proposed an anomaly detection technique
based on convolutional autoencoders for landmine detection
in GPR data. The proposed solution is a data-driven approach
exploiting a one-class paradigm. Our system uses only data
not containing landmine traces at training stage. This makes
the system robust to a wide variety of targets, as no strong
assumptions are a priori made. Moreover, it is easy to train the
system on any specific soil condition. In a practical situation,
the system could be trained on a small area that has been
previously checked to not contain landmines. Then, it can be
used to test neighboring regions. Future work will focus on
disambiguation between anomalies due to actual landmines or
different buried objects.
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